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Preference-Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality
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Duncan MacIntosh 
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1. Introduction 
 
On the received theory of practical rationality, rational choices must maximize one's expected 
utility.
2
 But sometimes--in Paradoxical Choice Situations (PCSs)--one's basis for choices (e.g., 
preferences, beliefs, dispositions, intentions) will affect the choices of other agents. They will 
choose favourably to one satisfying one's preferences only if one's choice basis is not 
maximization on one's current preferences. Paradoxically, it seems maximizing not to maximize. 
David Gauthier thinks it rational here to adopt a disposition constraining oneself from 
maximizing, and that non-maximizing choices are then rational; an action is rational if dictated 
by a disposition it maximized to adopt.
3
 
     I give another solution: do not refrain from maximizing, but adopt whichever preferences it 
would maximize to have as your choice basis given your current preferences; maximize on your 
revised preferences in subsequent choices.
4
 We thus get the choices Gauthier thought would 
1. For helpful discussion I thank Neera Badhwar, David Braybrooke, Bob Bright, Douglas Butler, 
Peter Danielson, Bob Martin, Tory McGeer, Howard Sobel, Kadri Vihvelin, Sheldon Wein and 
especially Julie Colterjohn, Richmond Campbell, and Terry Tomkow. Thanks also to my 
commentator, David Zimmerman, at the 1988 CPA, to which part of an earlier version was 
given. Finally, I am very grateful to referees Gregory Kavka and Michael Webster, to two 
anonymous referees and to the editors for advice on form and for deep questions. A Killam Post-
Doctoral Fellowship from Dalhousie University funded early research. 
2. For details, see Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, eds., Paradoxes of Rationality and 
Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem (Vancouver: The University of 
British Columbia Press 1985). 
3. David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986), Chs. I, V, VI, and 
`Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality,' Ethics, 94 (1984) 474-495. 
4. I suggested this in `Two Gauthiers?,' Dialogue, 28 (1988) 43-61 and later papers. It appears 
briefly in different forms in Gregory Kavka, `Some Paradoxes of Deterrence,' The Journal of 
Philosophy, 75 (1978) 285-302, reprinted in John Perry and Michael Bratman, eds., Introduction 
to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press 1986) 
follow a choice of dispositions, but need not call non-maximizing choices rational. We save the 
received theory by applying it not just to choices of actions--means to ends--but also of ends 
(given current ends). 
     This, too, however, offends orthodoxy. For we normally think it rational to prefer something, 
x, only on three pretexts: x has an objectively preferable property, or a property one prefers 
things to have, or x's obtaining would advance a preference one has. To these I add that 
preferring x would advance one's preferences; one prefers x not because of properties of x, but of 
the preference for x. This is a study of the rationality of revising one's preferences on that pretext. 
 
2. A Paradox For Instrumental Rationality 
 
To begin, we need a PCS. One would be a Prisoners Dilemma (PD) where the agents will know 
each other's choice basis and may amend their own before the game.
5
 But the Deterrence 
Dilemma (DD) is more vivid
6
: unless you, a nuclear super-power, intend to retaliate if attacked 
by another (unless you "Intend") and unless this would guide you in an attack, you will be 
attacked. You prefer that harms to everyone be minimal. Since Intending would deter harms, it 
maximizes. But if you are attacked, it is not maximizing to retaliate (to "Act"); that would only 
cause more harm. (Everyone will die, so there is no future deterrent advantage to Acting.) 
Actions are rational if maximizing, and retaliating is not, so it cannot be rationally intended. But 
intending maximizes and so seems rational, even though the act intended is non-maximizing. 
What to do? 
     Gauthier thinks it rational to Intend for that maximizes, rational to Act for that expresses a 
516-526 (references are to the latter), David Lewis, `Devil's Bargains and the Real World,' in 
Douglas Maclean, ed., The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age (Totowa, 
N.J.: Rowan and Allenheld 1984) 141-154, and Amartya Sen, `Choice, Orderings and Morality,' 
in Stephan Korner, ed., Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1974) 54-67. It is 
mentioned skeptically in Jordan Howard Sobel, `Maximizing, Optimizing, and Prospering,' 
Dialogue, 27 (1988) 233-262, and in passing in some of his earlier papers. Edward McClennen, 
in his `Prisoner's Dilemma and Resolute Choice,' in Campbell and Sowden, 94-104, and his 
`Constrained Maximization and Resolute Choice,' Social Philosophy & Policy, 5 (1988) 95-118, 
may give views on preferences for the Prisoner's Dilemma like those I push here for PCSs in 
general; if so, I am developing his idea. But he may not see agents undergoing revisions in their 
preferences in PCSs; they would just have different ones then, or just resolve to act differently. I 
hope to examine elsewhere what the former might involve. I argue that resolutions cannot 
rationalize non-maximizing choices in my `McClennen's Early Co-operative Solution to the 
Prisoner's Dilemma,' The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1991) 341-358. 
5. E.g., see Gauthier, Morals By Agreement, Chs. I, IV, V, and my `Preference's Progress: 
Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality,' Dialogue, 30 (1991) 3-32. 
6. For the DD, see Gauthier, `Deterrence,' Lewis, `Devil's Bargains,' and Kavka, `Some 
Paradoxes.' 
rational intention, and actions are rational if rationally intended. The rationality of Intending 
determines that of Acting.
7
 
     Some commentators, however, think one cannot rationally intend and perform a non-
maximizing action.
8
 E.g., Mark Vorobej agrees that if it is rational to Intend, it is rational to Act. 
But he thinks it irrational to Act for that is not what the intention it would maximize to have 
post-attack would demand; it would say to refrain from retaliating. But if it is irrational to Act, it 
is irrational to Intend. The rationality of Acting conditions that of Intending. Thus rational agents 
can't Intend. Nor, then, can they rationally Act. Deterrence by rational threat of rational 
retaliation is impossible for agents who disprefer harms.
9
 
 But Gauthier would think it no argument against Acting's rationality that it is not 
maximizing, nor against Intending's that the act intended is not, nor even that Acting expresses 
an intention not now maximizing to have. An intention is rational if adopting it maximized; an 
action, if it expresses such an intention. It maximized to Intend pre-attack, so retaliation would 
express an intention it then maximized to adopt. Thus Intending and Acting are rational.
10
 Still, 
to call them such for his reasons we must accept his account of rationality. But I think we can 
rationalize them on the standard account. 
 
3. Rational Revisions of Preference-Functions 
 
I now rehabilitate a possibility rejected (for reasons we will soon address in general terms) by 
David Lewis
11
, Gregory Kavka
12
, and Gauthier
13
: a rational agent would come to prefer to 
retaliate. For it maximizes to deter. He can only deter if he would rationally retaliate if attacked 
so his enemy fears him. He would only find retaliation rational if he preferred it. Thus, pre-
attack, it is maximizing and so rational for him to so revise his preferences as to find it 
7. Gauthier, `Deterrence.' 
8. Kavka, `Some Paradoxes,' 519-521, and Mark Vorobej, `Gauthier on Deterrence,' Dialogue, 25 
(1986) 471-476. 
9. Vorobej, `Gauthier on Deterrence.' 
10. I think Vorobej's criticism can be made conclusive. See my `Retaliation Rationalized: 
Gauthier's Solution to the Deterrence Dilemma,' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 72 (1991) 9-32, 
my `Libertarian Agency and Rational Morality: Action-Theoretic Objections to Gauthier's 
Dispositional Solution of the Compliance Problem,' The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 26 
(1988) 399-425, and my `Preference's Progress,' where I try to show that rational choices must 
maximize. 
11. Lewis, `Devil's Bargains,' 153-154. 
12. Kavka, `Some Paradoxes,' 520-525. 
13. Gauthier, `Deterrence.' 
maximizing and so rational to retaliate, to become one who prefers that harms be minimal except 
after an attack, where he prefers retaliating to minimizing harms. The new preference then makes 
rational the previously irrational intention to retaliate. Retaliation from the new preference, and 
so from the intention it rationalizes, will maximize on the new preference and so be standardly 
rational.
14
 If he prefers for its own sake that harms be minimal, he should come now instead to 
prefer to retaliate if attacked later, for its own sake; he has conclusive instrumental grounds for 
seeing retaliation as a better intrinsic good. This deters, for retaliation then maximizes; it is the 
choice he would rationally make post-attack, the one his enemy fears. Intending and Acting are 
rational. But classical rationality is preserved: rational choices maximize on the preferences had 
when choosing. One maximizes on one's initial preferences in choosing to supplant them with 
retaliatory ones, then maximizes on them in choosing to retaliate. 
     The guiding thought: to choose rationally is to maximize on one's preferences. But sometimes 
it maximizes to commit to deciding one's future choices in some way other than that of 
maximizing on the preferences one now has. Still, rational choices must maximize. So to choose 
ways of making future choices that will make your future choices rational, you must choose ways 
choices from which would maximize. This requires choosing a new preference-ordering for 
deciding choices. Any other determinant would yield irrational choices because it would have 
you choose against your preference-ordering, and so, irrationally. For if you must choose a new 
way of making future choices, that is because it maximizes now to be inclined to choose later 
against your original ordering. But since rational choice must express the ordering you have 
when choosing, to choose rationally later, you must have changed the ordering. 
     Is this stoicism?
15
 That is either the view that one shouldn't care about what happens (for one 
can't affect it), or shouldn't care about whether what one cares to happen happens (same reason), 
or should care only that what will inevitably happen, happen (for one can't make it otherwise). 
But I say one should care about things the caring about which will advance one's prior cares. 
Stoicism is defeatist: yield to the ineluctable. I counsel strategy: change the world by changing 
your values. Stoicism assumes agents want to care about what they can get (or its rationales are 
non-sequiturs). I assume that to care about something is to be prepared, ceteris paribus, to do 
what is needed to get it. 
     So: we can get Gauthier's conclusions on which actions are rational from the received theory 
since it justifies preference-functions on which retaliation maximizes.
16
 Agents face a second-
14. I give a similar rationale for revising one's preferences before facing some PDs in my `Co-
operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma,' Philosophical Studies, 64 (1991) 21-33, and my 
`Preference's Progress.' Also, see McClennen's papers. 
15. The question is from Kavka's referee's report. 
16. In `Two Gauthiers?,' I argue that a similar reading of Gauthier's Constrained Maximizer 
disposition best serves his conclusions on the rationality of morality as exemplified in rational 
choices in some PDs. See also McClennen, `Constrained Maximization.' Gauthier insists in 
`Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation: A Reply to My Critics,' Social 
Philosophy & Policy, 5 (1988) 173-221, that his proposal is different and independently viable. 
order choice not among dispositions constraining preference expression, but among preferences. 
These do the same job, but what it is to have a disposition able to rationalize retaliation is now 
straightforward: it is to have preferences which dispose one to retaliate because they make it 
maximizing. 
 
4. Objections to the Rational Preference to Retaliate 
 
Doesn't the old preference rationalize dropping the retaliatory one post-attack, when action on it 
can only increase harms? No, for you now prefer post-attack retaliation to post-attack harm-
minimizing; you no longer prefer harm-minimizing simpliciter. 
     But you do not initially have a preference to retaliate, only that harms be minimal. This makes 
you wish to adopt the former only as a means to minimizing harms. So since it is only an 
instrumental preference, and since it is pointless after the aim it was to serve failed, won't 
dropping it be rational? No. For while you adopt it for instrumental reasons, it is not a preference 
for retaliating as a means, but for its own sake. So to act rationally from it post-attack is to 
retaliate, not to drop it and minimize harms. You acquire it for instrumental reasons, but it is 
intrinsic. 
     One has an intrinsic or basic preference for x just if one prefers x as an end--"intrinsic" 
because one prefers its target for itself, not its power to cause something else, and "basic" 
because such preferences are the basis for deciding which other preferences to have, e.g., for 
things which help satisfy one's basic preferences. (These are not necessarily irrevocable or hard-
wired.) If one prefers x only for its power to cause something else, y, preferred as an end, one 
instrumentally prefers x. The difference between the two preference types is in what one finds 
preferable in the target, x. In the former, one finds x preferable, in the latter, x's power to help 
cause what one prefers in itself (so that one prefers x only if and while it so helps). 
     This distinguishes preference types. But we must also distinguish kinds of reasons for them. 
The tradition sees only these reasons for preferring a condition, x: first, x has objective value. But 
this is outside the theory of rationality given preferences (where the utility one gets if x obtains 
measures its value, not something in x). The second: x has a property one already prefers in 
things for itself; the third: x would cause ends already preferred. To these, I add: preferring x 
would cause such ends; in a DD, intrinsically preferring retaliation would serve one's basic 
aversion to harms. 
     But doesn't one enslave oneself to a preference which, post-attack, would be irrational? For it 
now works against the anti-harm preference it was to serve. So isn't one now just the helpless 
automaton of a blind and isolate rogue preference? Doesn't action on it fail to maximize on the 
balance of one's "real" preferences? How is retaliation now any more rational and voluntary than 
if one had put the matter beyond one's control by delegating the decision to retaliate to a 
machine, or to someone else? 
     Well first, one is never a slave. One willingly acquires new preferences for their deterrent 
effect, and then willingly retaliates because, given them, one then wants to if attacked. Nor is one 
"blind"; one's eyes are open in adopting the new preferences, and in retaliating from them. 
Second, one does not adopt an unintegrated preference, one yielding an incoherent preference 
function in which one prefers retaliating to not harming and not harming to retaliating; one does 
not acquire a preference discordant with one's continuing preferences, then irrationally act on it 
against them. Rather, one changes the ranking (acquires a preference function in which, post-
attack, retaliation ranks higher than harm prevention) as recommended by the present ranking, 
then retaliates rationally as that then maximizes, reflects what one all-in prefers post-attack. 
One's preferences are integrated, coherent. Finally, whether an action maximizes depends on the 
preferences had when acting, not on ones no longer had. One's new ones are (now) one's "real" 
ones. 
     But suppose you think the enemy can be deterred by you preferring to retaliate. So you do. He 
attacks. But then you learn his attack was locked in: your preferring could not have deterred. 
There was never any point in it, so surely retaliating is also pointless. But you now prefer to and 
to be rational it seems you must. The lesson: do not prefer to retaliate simpliciter, but to 
minimize harms except when attacked by those who would have been deterred by your readiness 
to retaliate, in which case, to retaliate. (In this game, the enemy cannot help being either locked-
in or threat-sensitive.) You then prefer minimum harms in normal situations, but in attacks, 
prefer not to retaliate against those who would not have been deterred, but to retaliate against 
those who would. So you need only retaliate where a readiness to do so would have deterred. 
(Deterring is just lowering the chance of attack. Thus an attack does not prove that you did not 
deter; the chance of your readiness affecting the enemy's choice is fixed independently of his 
decision in this case.) Adopting this ranking, then, better maximizes on your preferences. For it is 
sensitive to future information and commits you only to the potential for harming needed to 
minimize the odds of all harms.
17
 
17. Is Gauthier's account better here? For he may think it rational to retaliate only if the 
disposition to do so was maximizing, i.e., deterring. If one learns it never was, one needn't 
retaliate. But I think Gauthier holds that a disposition maximized not if it in fact made a desired 
outcome likely, but was believed to on the evidence when adopted. So unless he carefully 
formulates the disposition, his agent too must retaliate against those later discovered to be 
undeterrable. For the disposition to retaliate against them would still be one it "subjectively" 
maximized to adopt earlier. Thus he must have the disposition be to retaliate only against those 
still believed to have been deterrable (as I must have the rational retaliatory preference), or he 
must say that things "maximize" relative to the facts, not just beliefs. (Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for the issue, and to Terry Tomkow for help replying.) 
     So: it is rational to revise one's preferences so that one intrinsically prefers minimal harms 
only if that does not involve letting off deterrable attackers, otherwise preferring to retaliate 
against the threat-sensitive; thereafter it is rational, because maximizing, to retaliate. This 
answers Vorobej: it is rational to act on those preferences. Thus as far as that goes, it is not 
irrational to acquire them. 
     But is this not bad faith, willful irrationality? For one first hates harms, and later prefers to 
harm if attacked. How can this happen without one either acting against one's preferences or self-
deceivedly thinking it no harm to retaliate? Well, the new ranking reflects one's original one 
when one adopts it, being the maximizing and so rational one to acquire given the original. Post-
attack, it rationalizes actions which do not reflect the original, but no matter, for one no longer 
has it and rational choice proceeds from current preferences. (Likewise, one has no reason to 
regret having become a retaliator, for one retrospects the decision from retaliatory values.) One 
constantly (and rationally) believes that retaliation harms, but one's attitude towards harming in a 
DD changes. 
     But it would be irrational to alter one's beliefs here, so why not one's preferences? Because 
rational belief follows evidence. If you believed just for practical reasons (e.g., to get money) 
your belief would be irrational by epistemic standards. But there are no standards which an 
instrumentally rationalized change in basic preferences violates. Or are there...? 
 
5.On the Very Idea of a Rational Revision of Basic Preferences; Their Nature and Rational 
Kinematics
18
 
 
Normally one rationally prefers something when one sees it as either needed for, or of a kind 
with, what one already basically prefers. In the former, one does not come to like it for itself, 
only its use as a means; in the latter, one does, but not because one has changed one's basic 
preferences, only because one sees it as like things already preferred. So can one really rationally 
revise basic preferences just because they are served by their own revision? The seeming oddness 
of this may owe to our precritical theories of the nature of basic preferences, their origins, and the 
prospects for their rational revision. We now consider these and their implications for our 
proposal. 
     Theory (a): one gets basic preferences non-rationally: by heredity, association and reward 
conditioning. We are born with desires for food, air, etc. We come to intrinsically value other 
things by associating them with satisfying our "natural" preferences. So we come to like the 
dinner bell for itself by associating it with food. One is neither rational nor irrational in one's first 
preferences--one is just born with them--nor in acquiring new ones--one just does by habitual 
association of their objects with ones already basically preferred. (Think of Hume or B.F. 
Skinner.) 
     Discussion: but even if the process of acquiring a basic preference is non-rational--if one 
cannot rationally directly adopt one--it may yet be rational to arrange conditioning that will result 
in one.
19
 
     Theory (b): one only acquires "new" basic preferences when one sees that some conditions 
have properties one already basically prefers as a kind, and so one comes to intrinsically prefer 
ones on which one is newly enlightened. This is just what it is to come to like something for its 
own sake.
20
 But one never rationally acquires basic preferences for new kinds. 
18. Thanks to Richmond Campbell, Douglas Butler and Howard Sobel for discussion on the 
issues in this section. 
19. See Kavka, `Some Paradoxes,' `The Toxin Puzzle,' Analysis, 43 (1983) 33-36, and 
`Responses to the Paradox of Deterrence,' in Maclean, 155-159. He sees some justification for 
doing it, but may not see it as conclusive, especially for rational moral agents. See below and my 
`Kavka Revisited: Some Paradoxes of Deterrence Dissolved,' (unpublished manuscript). 
20. Thanks to Sobel for this suggestion. 
     Discussion: if (b) says one cannot acquire a basic preference for a new kind, it is likely 
false--people can be conditioned into almost anything; if that one cannot rationally arrange to 
acquire one, this seems groundless given rationales like the above for acquiring one in a DD. 
Now, "coming to like something for its own sake" is ambiguous between coming to like its 
intrinsic properties--for whatever reason--and coming to like it because of those properties; it 
conflates the resulting attitude with a reason for adopting it. It can be a reason to prefer 
something that one already prefers things of its general kind, to prefer it because of its intrinsic 
properties. But sometimes one should prefer something because there is advantage to preferring 
it. There are more reasons for preferring things than are dreamed of in (b). 
     But if it is a reason to prefer something that one already prefers things of its kind, surely it is a 
reason not to prefer something that one disprefers things of its kind. So surely in dispreferring 
harms we must disprefer actions increasing them, and so disprefer retaliating?
21
 One has some 
reason to disprefer it, for it would cause intrinsically dispreferred harms. Preferring to retaliate 
will cause retaliation on attack. That is instrumentally dispreferred. So, were this the only thing 
relevant, preferring to retaliate should be instrumentally dispreferred. But is this conclusive? 
     You must prefer having whichever preferences would minimize harms (the deterring basic 
preference to retaliate), but you disprefer doing what will pointlessly increase harms (retaliating). 
Which should you prefer, deterring attack, or not retaliating? Well, which maximizes your 
expected utility (EU)? To decide the EU of retaliating, multiply the possible utilities and 
disutilities of doing so by their odds, then add. Say 50 harms will certainly be caused by 
retaliating, refraining, sure to cause none; an EU for refraining of 50. To decide the EU of 
preferring intrinsically to retaliate, multiply the possible utilities and disutilities of doing so by 
their odds, then add. The best that could happen is 100 harms saved (no attack, no retaliation), 
the chance, high, say .99, the worst, 100 harms in the outcome (attack, retaliation), the chance, 
low, .01. An EU of 97.9. 97.9 beats 50, so you should come to intrinsically prefer retaliating. 
(Assume one cannot retaliate unless one prefers to, nor prefer to retaliate and not do it if attacked. 
Since preferring to retaliate and refraining from retaliating are mutually exclusive, choosing one 
is omitting the other. So their EUs are comparable, the higher of preference revision decisive 
over the lower of refraining from retaliating.) You should prefer having the deterring preference, 
for you can most probably prevent more harms with it than by not deterring and refraining from 
retaliating. Thus, your preference for minimum harms yields a stronger instrumental preference 
for (is a better reason for having) a basic preference for retaliating. 
     That you would normally instrumentally prefer refraining is not decisive in whether you 
should intrinsically prefer retaliating. This depends on whether preferring it, or not so preferring 
in order to be able to refrain, would maximize on the basic preference grounding the normal 
instrumental preference. For satisfying an instrumental preference yields no utility itself; only if 
the condition satisfying it causes one satisfying an intrinsic preference. So you have no 
independent rational duty to your instrumental preferences,only your basic ones--here best served 
by their own revision. This justifies abandoning one's strongest or highest-ranked preference as a 
means to satisfying it. (Actually, we should not speak of dropping or adopting a preference; 
rather one reranks preferences, changes one's set of preference-functions, of rankings of 
conditions in a preference-ordering. If I use the former locutions, I mean the latter.) 
21. This worry is in Kavka, `Some Paradoxes.' 
Precritically,it may seem an argument against (conditionally) preferring to inflict retaliation's 
harms that one now prefers minimum harms. But this very preference makes acquiring a 
retaliatory one rational in PCSs. Oddly, that one prefers to minimize harms should make it easier, 
not harder, to become one who sometimes prefers to harm. 
     Note: you do not come to prefer retaliation because retaliation has a property you originally 
intrinsically preferred (for it doesn't), but because preferring it does--that minimizes harms. This 
is the novelty here, is how the rational acquisition of basic preferences differs from that of 
instrumental ones, and from coming to prefer something for its having a trait already intrinsically 
preferred. 
     Theory (c): we get a preference for x by seeing x's objective value, as if preferableness were 
an objective property, like mass (as in moral realism). Retaliation is not objectively preferable. 
So it would be bad faith, willful irrationality, to let instrumental factors make us prefer it, just as 
it would be to let them affect our beliefs. Preferring is more like believing or perceiving than like 
wanting; thus the rational kinematics of preference is epistemic, not pragmatic. So acquiring a 
preference for retaliation would be like epistemic irrationality since one knows it to be 
objectively dispreferable. 
     Discussion: value realism is notoriously problematic. But even were it true, the preference for 
retaliation might objectively have the moral property of it being obligatory to acquire it (for the 
harming deterred), retaliation, that of it being obligatory not to perform it (since it would cause 
gratuitous harms), and our paradox returns. Also, the solution: presumably, one must act on the 
strongest obligation, which, surely is to do what would likely result in the least objectively bad 
conditions; one must deter and so prefer to retaliate. So if value is objective, and if its accurate 
perception can give one a DD, it also affords an escape. For to have a DD, one must find that 
preferring to retaliate (and so to harm after an attack) and refraining from retaliating (and so from 
harming) have objective value, but that the former's is higher in the circumstances. Otherwise, 
Intending would not maximize (objective value) and one would not have the dilemma. 
     But one sees that harming has negative value, and seeing that preferring conditionally to harm 
has positive value does not change this. So isn't to adopt the preference to overlook the negative 
value of the condition preferred, like a willful, epistemically irrational misreading of value facts 
about harms? 
     Perhaps the tension can be eliminated this way: in the paradoxical situation of the DD, 
harming by retaliating cannot have lower value than refraining. For since preferring to retaliate is 
objectively preferable, and since one can only rightly prefer the truly preferable, retaliating must 
be too. To pursue the analogy with belief, if one has evidence that not p, but stronger evidence 
that p, one must take p as probably true. One does not overlook the counter-evidence; but the 
total evidence favours p. Now, if one has evidence that retaliating is objectively dispreferable 
(evidence consisting, perhaps, in one's current aversion to it, for here, preferring is perceiving, 
one's preferences therefore tending to track objective value), but stronger evidence that it is 
preferable (in one's current stronger preference to deter, and so, to prefer to retaliate), one is 
justified in preferring to retaliate; for one is justified in finding it probably objectively preferable 
all things considered.
22
 And we could defend it by saying that it is not just harming, but 
22. My thanks to Douglas Butler for this approach. 
implementing a morally obligatory value; harming for an exonerating reason (for whoever had to 
so value). This is like Gauthier's move on rationality: retaliation is prima face irrational given an 
aversion to harms, but is made rational by its expressing a disposition rational to adopt to serve 
the aversion. But while Gauthier thought one's preferences could remain constant and a non-
maximizing action be rational, I think one must revise them so that one's actions will maximize 
(but on the new preferences). Likewise, here, maybe the morally correct preferences vary with 
situations, the objective moral values of acts, with their historical contexts. 
     If this still seems implausible, perhaps we must question the conception of value on which EU 
measures it. For it may seem refuted by this argument: if it is right, an action's value is its EU. 
Since the EU of deterring (which entails retaliating if attacked) is (pre-attack) higher than that of 
not deterring (which entails refraining), retaliating must have higher value than refraining. 
Absurd; objectively, retaliating must be at least as bad as deterring is good. So that theory of 
value must be false. 
     But this is unfair to the subjective theory of value; for we managed to pose (and, perhaps, 
resolve) the DD even for the objective theory. So how things rank in value, and whether a present 
attitude's value can determine that of a future action, are independent of value's nature. Preferring 
to retaliate and retaliating might have higher objective value than preferring to refrain and 
refraining. In any case, if we accept a conception of value fitting instrumental rationality (where 
nothing has value independently of preferences), we must accept these consequences for value 
order in DDs. And if we cannot analyze instrumental rationality without intruding objective 
value, this troubles all rational choice theory, not just our proposal. Moreover, taking it as a 
problem on grounds of the above reductio may make DDs (situations where one is not just 
conflicted, but has a way out) impossible. If it correctly portrays the objective theory's 
consequences, DDs can only arise if the subjective theory is true (where retaliating can be 
justified by the value of preferring it). (More in Section 9.) 
     I learned another argument for (c) from Kavka. He says that on my view, 
 
the only justification for having certain preferences...may have nothing to do with the 
qualities of the states of affairs these are preferences for, but only with the instrumental 
value of having these preferences for satisfying earlier ones. But these...in turn, might be 
of only instrumental value, and so on. Unless basic preferences are somehow anchored in 
the features of the targeted states of affairs, why does and should it matter to us 
whether...they are satisfied?
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     His worry: it would/should only matter to one that one's preferences be satisfied if one feels/is 
justified in them. I say a preference is only justified by its advancing another one. But then the 
same for it, etc. So there is no final justification. So it does not/should not matter to us that our 
preferences be satisfied. But it does/should, so my theory is false. If value is objectively in things, 
however, there will be final justifications: I am objectively justified in preferring x if x is 
objectively good or preferable, subjectively justified if I think it is. My reason for preferring x is 
that x is good, or so I think, and in thinking this I have reason for it to matter to me that x obtain. 
 23. I quote from his referee's report. 
But then it is not the instrumental value of a preference that justifies having it or caring that it be 
satisfied, but facts (or beliefs) about its target. 
     But Kavka makes some dubious assumptions: first, it can't matter to one that the preference 
for x be satisfied without reason to prefer x. This may hold for instrumental preferences, but not 
basic ones. For to have a basic one for x is for it to matter to one that x obtain. If one prefers x, 
for x to obtain is for that preference to be satisfied; thus in having a basic preference for x, it 
matters to one that it be satisfied. And one might just have been born with it; that one did not get 
it by rational reflection or that there is no justification for it, does not mean one can't or shouldn't 
care that it be satisfied. If one basically prefers x, that is reasonable if there is no alternative 
preference whose possession would maximize on the first, i.e., if preferring x is not less 
conducive to x's obtaining than preferring something else, y. One does not need a reason to prefer 
x for it to matter to one that x obtain, except when rationally adjusting one's preferences. And 
when it would advance them to have new ones, that is a reason for the new ones. 
     A basic preference is rationally obligatory if adopting it advances a prior one. The issue only 
arises if one has preferences, so acquiring one's first ones is non-rational; they cannot be justified 
by prior ones. But a preference need not be justified to be reasonably held; we only explain what 
it is for one to be justified if it is. The first can, however, be rationally assessed by whether 
having different ones would best advance them (and by whether they are coherently ordered). 
     One can have a basic preference whose satisfaction matters to one even with no reason; why 
not also instrumental ones? One only cares about their targets for their power to cause what one 
values as an end. So one cannot have an instrumental preference without a basic one, and it can't 
matter that a condition instrumentally preferred obtain unless that would cause something 
intrinsically preferred. With no ends, one logically cannot have a preference for a means as such. 
Perhaps one could have an "instrumental preference" for x, another for y because y conduces to 
x, etc., but if one finds nothing intrinsically valuable, the objects of these preferences are not 
means to an end; only to a means. And if one's every preference is for a condition's power to 
cause another condition, nothing preferred for itself, one has infinitely many preferences. 
Otherwise one's first one, the one rationalizing the rest but itself groundless, is basic; one does 
not have only (so-called) instrumental preferences. I don't know whether there could be agents 
with only such preferences, i.e., with infinitely many; nor whether we could ever rationalize their 
actions: we might be unable to give finite explanations, and "infinite" ones in terms of "infinite 
reasons" might not really count as such. But this is academic, for I define a preference as 
instrumental just if its target is only preferred for its power to advance a basic preference. 
     Kavka's second assumption: one only has reason to prefer x given a final answer to the 
question, why prefer x? But true or not (see above on regresses), one has an answer on my 
account: preferring x advances one's basic preferences. It is not needed for them to justify other 
ones that one have a reason for them, only no reason against them. Once one has them, one cares 
that their targets obtain; and this can justify instrumental preferences and such alternative basic 
ones as would advance the originals. 
     The third assumption: if the only reason for preferring x is that this advances another 
preference, the same holds for it, etc.; with only instrumental reasons for preferring things, there 
is nothing one prefers for itself to be a final reason. But we saw that one doesn't need a reason for 
all of one's preferences for one to ground another, nor for there to be things one cares about for 
themselves. Thus there can be final reasons, so satisfaction of our preferences can matter to us. 
And it suffices for a preference's adoption to be rational that it advances one's prior basic 
preferences. Thus one can have only instrumental rationales for one's basic preferences (if one 
has reasons for any of them) without threat to their being basic. This is only implausible if it 
implies that one prefers nothing for itself. But it really implies that one has preferences which are 
ones for things for themselves. (Do not confuse instrumental reasons for a preference with 
instrumental preferences. One can have instrumental reasons for basic preferences.) So one can 
have rational basic preferences without value realism. There need be no objectively preferable 
conditions, only ones whose intrinsic properties one prefers. 
     Besides, value realism cannot explain why things matter to us. x can be objectively preferable 
and it not matter to me whether x obtains. I can even believe x to be good and it not matter to 
me--I may not respect the good. For it to matter to me that objectively preferable conditions 
obtain, I must subjectively prefer them. Another queerness in objective goodness: its recognition 
is not inherently motivating. This does not trouble the subjective theory: to subjectively prefer x 
is, ceteris paribus, to be moved to make x obtain, to care about its obtaining. And philosophers 
only want an objective theory to make subjective values criticizable. But our theory advances that 
hope in affording some basis for judging basic values. 
     Kavka might agree that it can only matter that one's instrumental preferences be satisfied if 
they serve a basic one; also, that to have a basic one is to care about its target's obtaining. But he 
may yet wonder, if the only reason for having any preference is that it advances another, do we 
have any reason for a basic preference? If yes, it is either that it advances another one, or 
something about the condition preferred. If the former, we have a regress; if the later, a 
preference is not made rational by advancing a prior one. 
     But there is only a problem if every reasonable preference must have a reason; and it needn't. 
A held preference is rationally permissible if having another one would not better advance it. 
Most are reasonable, for most are self-advancing; having them maximizes the odds that their 
targets will obtain because rational agents try to create what they prefer. But a reasonable 
preference need not be uniquely rational. Nature can arbitrarily give one initial preferences: I may 
be born with a preference for eating chocolate, you for anything but. Both are presumptively 
reasonable since they motivate and so maximally advance their own satisfaction. They are only 
irrational if having other preferences would better advance them. 
     Finally, one's basic preferences can be anchored in features of targeted states of affairs, as 
when, having a basic preference for conditions with certain properties, one prefers a condition on 
seeing it has them. My innovation is a theory of the rationality of basic preferences for new kinds 
of condition. Even there, when one acquires a new preference because that advances a prior one, 
it is because of the properties of the first one's targets that one acquires the later: one adopts it to 
cause the targets of the first. (Here, though, it is not the condition targeted in a preference that 
rationalizes it, but that a target of an earlier preference is made likely by acquiring one with a 
different target.) 
     But suppose I basically prefer whatever has property F, and see that a has F; I have reason to 
basically prefer a. But suppose the preference for Fxs, or a stronger basic preference, would be 
advanced by me dispreferring Fxs; I have reason not to prefer a. Isn't there a conflict of 
rationales? No. For whether one's basic preferences are sound is prior to whether a condition 
fitting them should be preferred. But this is only revealed in PCSs. Usually the subordinate 
consideration operates because normally one needn't drop a preference to advance it. But that 
consideration only applies to preferences rational to keep; it is over-ridden if revising them 
maximizes.
24
 An agent's preferences might leave him indifferent between revising and not; or he 
might have incoherent values advising both revising and retaining the same preference. But in the 
first case he could rationally choose by a coin toss; and in the second, his ill-ordered values make 
him irrational on any account and so no counter-example to ours. 
     Theory (d): we are born with fixed actual or potential basic preferences, but which ones are 
"to the fore" depends on the availability of goods, our training, our beliefs about our 
circumstances, etc. 
     Discussion: for (d) to fully explain what determines a preference's manifestation on a given 
occasion, we would need versions of (a)-(c), the relevant facts being either associative (a), 
deductive from active preferences (b), involving perceptions of objective value properties (c), or 
pragmatic (our theory). Moreover, whether one has all the preferences one can ever have at birth, 
or just the potential for them, recalls Locke on innate ideas. And we might complain in a 
Lockean spirit that there is no difference between a preference not activated except under certain 
conditions, and one not had except then. So the verdict on (d) is in those on (a)-(c), giving no 
further reason against pragmatic preference revision. Doesn't Decision Theory require (d) for 
agents to have a firm basis for rational choices? If one's preferences are not givens, but are 
variable, how can we speak of the rationality of a choice given preferences? But this only 
requires determinate preferences at each time of choice, not the same ones at all times. And we 
preserve this: in choosing to revise one's preferences, one chooses from one's current ones; in 
later choosing actions, one chooses from one's new ones. So our theory does not deprive rational 
choice of a basis.
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6. Preference Revision: Action or Not (and Does it Matter)? 
 
A change is direct if seeing its aptness suffices to induce it, voluntary if it occurs just because one 
wants it to, costly if it lowers one's utility (though it may raise it overall by its consequences' 
utility). Is rational basic preference revision voluntary, like action; or is it like the non-voluntary, 
direct acquiring of new beliefs; or must one arrange to be conditioned into it by non-rational (and 
maybe costly) processes? 
     In the normal rational kinematics of preference, preferences change non-voluntarily directly 
one sees the conditions justifying it. Likewise, an epistemically rational agent non-voluntarily 
acquires a belief directly on seeing conclusive evidence for it. Normal belief-change on new 
evidence is costless
26
, as is normal preference-change. The reason normal belief and preference 
24. Thanks to Terry Tomkow for discussion here. 
25. Thanks to Peter Schotch and an anonymous referee for help on this. And see my `Retaliation 
Rationalized,' pp. 28-29. 
26. There may be a utility cost if one disprefers the beliefs one acquires. But our agent only 
prefers that harms be minimal. So if he comes to believe that harms have occurred, it is they 
which trouble him, not his belief in them. 
changes have all these properties is that they are not actions. They are direct responses to events, 
not meddlings in them, and are caused by evidence, not volition. Intention acquisition is similar. 
A rational agent immediately, directly comes to intend to do what she now sees conclusive 
reason to do now, but so far as intending to do something implies wanting to do it, she will do it 
voluntarily--because she wants to do it. Where the action is to be done later, she will now intend 
to do it then directly on seeing conclusive reasons to do it then, and will (typically) voluntarily do 
it when she thinks then is now.
27
 
     We claim that pragmatically justified basic preference-changes also occur directly. But how 
can one "directly" change one's preferences on pragmatic pretexts? It just spontaneously occurs 
on seeing one's predicament. If you see that x has properties you intrinsically prefer, you come to 
prefer x. Is it sensible to ask how? If you get good evidence for p, you believe p. Is there a 
problem about how you get yourself to believe it? If you see that it would serve your desires to 
have some desire, we say you will acquire it. Why should the question how arise here? 
     Perhaps for this reason: the pragmatic rationale for preferring x speaks not of the properties of 
x, but of the preference for x. So surely it justifies not an attitude to x, but to the preference for 
x.
28
 A rational agent would respond to a good argument that p is true by believing p, to a good 
argument that x is preferable by preferring x. Commensurately, wouldn't she respond to a good 
argument that preferring x is preferable not by preferring x, but by preferring to prefer x? So how 
does she get from the second-order to the first-order attitude? But one can argue that p is true by 
arguing that the belief that p is a true belief; so can't one argue that x is preferable by arguing that 
the preference for x is preferable? This may seem a bad analogy, however. For p is true iff the 
belief that p is true. So to argue the one is to argue the other. But surely the preference for x can 
be preferable even if x is not; so arguing the former is not arguing the latter, and so is not arguing 
for a first-order attitude to x. We claim, however, that in some situations, PCSs, it is a reason to 
prefer x that preferring x is preferable; in PCSs, to argue that preferring x is preferable is to argue 
that x is preferable. Indeed, as we saw above in the discussion of objective value, PCSs prove 
that the value of x and the value of an attitude to x cannot always vary independently. (Compare 
Gauthier: PCSs prove that an action's rationality cannot always be independent of the rationality 
of the disposition to do it.) Thus in a PCS, it is rational to respond to the argument that preferring 
x is preferable by directly preferring x. 
     But perhaps we have only shown that it would be practically rational to acquire retaliatory 
preferences, not that retaliation is preferable. If so, to acquire such preferences, one must arrange 
to get them by a non-rational process, like reward-conditioning. And this may be costly. But we 
can handle this: just factor the costs of self-alteration into those involved in the risk of having to 
retaliate; it is rational if the EU of revising one's preferences by the means needed exceeds that of 
not. 
 
 
27. See Terrance Tomkow, Against Representation (forthcoming, Cambridge University Press) 
on the relation between intentions and rational actions. 
28. Thanks to Sobel for the issue. 
7. Psychologies Perfect and Real; Contingent Constraints on Rational Self-Alterations; the 
Problem of Coherence 
 
Many think the DD exists only in theory. Does anything like it occur for real agents? Sure. E.g., 
in our early character development, it is demanded that we not just act a certain way but be a 
certain way, acquire certain values. This is induced by situations where our values will be 
advanced by their own revision. The teen wants acceptance and learns that he will only get it if 
he becomes "cool", autonomous from the approval of others, "his own man."
29
 But growing up is 
hard, raising the question, do we have fully rational psychologies, ones able to respond directly to 
the demands for change from the calculus of instrumental rationality? An empirical matter, and 
perhaps questionable, though I doubt adolescent anxieties call it into question. They may not 
reveal psychological barriers to direct shifts, but just represent the discomforts of the 
circumstances motivating them. 
     But now consider Kavka's Toxin Puzzle (TP)
30
, which may reveal biological obstacles to 
preference change. You are offered a million dollars ($1M) to intend tonight to drink a 
temporarily nauseating poison tomorrow. You needn't drink tomorrow to collect, only intend by 
tonight to drink tomorrow. This is a PCS since it maximizes to intend to drink, but not to drink. 
(You prefer the $1M to avoiding nausea, but dislike nausea and would normally avoid its 
causes.) I say you should prefer to drink. You then would get the $1M tonight, but would and 
should drink anyway tomorrow. But can you get a preference to drink simply by seeing its use in 
getting the $1M? 
     Assume that whatever one does to oneself, the poison will nauseate as a fact of biochemistry. 
Doesn't this mean one must disprefer drinking when one is to drink? So how will one's 
preferences be well-ordered if one acquires a preference to drink? Won't one prefer and disprefer 
it--have incoherent and so irrational preferences? Or won't it be impossible directly to prefer it by 
tonight since it cannot be made non-nauseating? 
     But nausea is not something one logically must disprefer. Indeed, one hears many do 
not--bulemics, anorexics, the Ancients who took emetics after feasts to renew their appetites. 
They, we hear, are nonchalant about it, and while they may first only endure it for its 
instrumental value (in keeping thin, renewing appetite), they may later like it for itself (or not 
mind it) from association with what they like for itself (thinness, appetite). So he who prefers 
what will nauseate him need not have ill-ordered preferences. 
29. For other examples, see my `Persons and the Satisfaction of Preferences: Problems in the 
Rational Kinematics of Values' (unpublished manuscript). 
30. Kavka, `The Toxin Puzzle.' 
     Some philosophers, though, think some experiences inherently unpleasant--pain, extreme 
hunger and thirst, nausea--others, pleasant--the tastes of some foods, the sensations of sex--and 
that these ground all disvalue and value. Coming to prefer to retaliate seems like coming to like 
pain, and since pain is inherently unpleasant, surely one can't rationally, if at all, come to prefer it 
for itself, nor retaliation either. (This is an aesthetic version of the objection from objective value, 
considered above.) 
     But many attitudes seem to separate an experience's being pleasant and being preferable: the 
masochist prefers to be hurt, the martyr, to suffer for others, the religious self-flagellant, to feel a 
physical wretchedness befitting his inherent sinfulness. It seems necessary to their getting what 
they prefer that they be in unpleasant states. Maybe they only instrumentally prefer them for their 
conducing to other things; perhaps the masochist just wants (pathological) proof of love, the 
martyr, to save others from suffering, the self-flagellant, to atone. But this need not be so. The 
masochist may just like--intrinsically prefer--painful sensations; the martyr may find more 
nobility in saving others by suffering than by a less unpleasant expedient; the self-flagellant may 
think his sinfulness part of his identity before God, self-infliction of pain the only appropriate 
response. If so, our account can recognize, explain, and, sometimes, rationalize the phenomena: 
even if some experiences are irreformably pleasant/unpleasant, that is separate from whether they 
ought to be preferred, from whether they are preferable or unpreferable. So even if our findings 
of things unpleasant is unalterable, our preferences for things need not be. 
     Still, it is contingent whether one's psychology is capable of preference-change on seeing its 
instrumental value (just as is whether one is capable of belief-change upon new evidence). There 
may be physiological barriers; or maybe attitudes get ingrained. Perhaps for some of us it is 
physically/psychologically impossible for our preferences to change directly on that pretext, or 
even for any conditioning to effect the change. But since it makes sense and need not yield ill-
ordered preferences, people so limited are not ideally rational. They do have an excuse: they 
cannot be otherwise; and to choose rationally given this, they must choose in light of it. Facing 
the TP, it would be irrational for them, knowing their limits, to contract to buy a house with the 
$1M they cannot get. But that says nothing against us on what they must do if ideally rational. 
One's current aversion to something need not be a conclusive reason to avoid it; only if the 
aversion is a preference rational to have. And preferences can rationalize their own abandonment, 
whether one's psychology allows this or not. Thus, that one now has a negative attitude to an 
action needn't be a conclusive objection to preferring to do it. 
     There are other possible worries for our proposal deriving from the fact that one's values are 
interconnected.
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 If one disprefers harms in general, one disprefers this and that harm, things 
causing harm, people who harm, etc. If one is averse to nausea, one is averse to its causes, 
perhaps to mention of it, etc. So to change one preference, mustn't one change many? And 
wouldn't the magnitude of the task obstruct change? Not necessarily. Suppose that, even 
considering all my preferences, it would maximize to change a given one and all of those 
associated with it. The advantage then justifies changing all of them, and their relatedness does 
not entail that this cannot occur directly. An analogy: I thought it would not rain today, but I was 
wrong. Many of my beliefs must change: I thought it would be dry but now I must believe it will 
31. Kavka brought this and the next few issues to my attention. 
be wet; I thought I wouldn't need my umbrella, but now, that I do, etc. But does that make it 
harder for me to believe it's raining? Surely not. All of my rain-relevant cognitive attitudes just 
change. The same, surely, for conative attitudes in connected value changes. Maybe I hated some 
people because I thought they stole something from me. Turns out it was all a mistake. Now I 
like them and all who sail with them; all my negative attitudes to them just become positive. 
Attitude connectedness may multiply the practical difficulties of change if one's physiology or 
psychological ingrainedness makes change hard in general. It may even make it practically 
impossible, but that doesn't make it irrational; it may require an expensive arranged process, 
though if the change still maximizes even given the expense, it is still rational, if it will not be 
direct. 
     But what if, considering all my preferences, changing a given one and their associates would 
not maximize? This holds if my strongest preference is to keep to a moral principle forbidding 
character corruption (on which, more below), or if my self-concept requires me to keep my 
preferences, i.e., if I prefer most not to revise myself, to be somehow true to my current self.
32
 
Now one may so prefer, but need not, I think, to be rational. And one is not then in a PCS. It is 
not rational to change--not because that is irrational in general, but because, given the preferences 
one happens to have, one does not most care that harms be minimal (as in the DD), or to get $1M 
(as in the TP), and so is not in a situation where, to cause the targets of one's strongest 
preferences (to maximize), one must change one's choice basis. 
     I say it is rational in the TP to prefer drinking the sickening toxin even with the $1M in hand. 
But what is the character of this preference? Does one now view illness as a desirable way of 
celebrating new wealth? Or is it only drinking this particular glass of toxin on this occasion that 
one prefers? More like the latter. For while in PCSs it maximizes to change one's preferences in 
some way, it generally maximizes to retain them, because having them tends to make their 
rational holders cause their targets. Thus in revising one's preferences so as to maximize on them, 
one should try so far as possible to preserve this tendency. One should acquire preferences 
maximization on which demands, as often as possible, behaviours just like those appropriate to 
the old preferences, and different only in the case where the PCS obliges one to intend an action 
not maximizing on the old. The revision must be the minimum mutilation required. Thus, in the 
DD, one should not go from hating harms to loving them, but to hating harms except when they 
comprise retaliations against deterrable attackers. When not dealing with such agents, one then 
behaves as before, minimizes harms. In changing one's preferences, one maximizes on the old 
(reduces the odds of there being any harms), and in maximizing on the new, one's actions still in 
effect maximize on the old, except in the special case of an attack (when one will cause the 
harms of a retaliation). And in the TP, one should not go from loving money and the avoidance 
of nausea to loving nausea, but to loving money and avoiding all nausea except that nausea a 
commitment to inducing which was a condition of getting $1M. Again, in changing one's 
preferences, one maximizes on the old--gets the $1M--but in normal situations, continues to 
avoid nausea, as if prosecuting one's old preferences; only in the one odd case, the drinking of 
this glass of poison, does one act differently. 
32. Howard Sobel may suggest agents have such a self-concept in his `Maximizing, Optimizing, 
and Prospering.' 
     But preferences are by nature related to the qualities of things, and rationally must vary in a 
coherent way with variations in those qualities. And nausea is nausea; whatever properties of it I 
hate in this nausea are also in that nausea. So how can I coherently have one attitude to the first 
and a different one to the second? How do my new attitudes make sense? Answer: their objects 
are different. The first is an aversion to all nausea the intention to induce which is not rewarded 
by $1M, the second, an affinity for such nausea the intention to induce which is so rewarded. My 
attitude in each case is to a condition of which nausea is but a part; the other parts of the 
conditions differ (one contains an intention to drink and a reward--the condition is a "fat" one 
spanning the preceding night). Thus my attitudes to the two conditions can coherently differ; I 
can hate one package and like the other because they are different packages. My preferences are 
coherent. (If I had had to acquire both positive and negative attitudes to the same properties of 
the same conditions, rationally I couldn't. For incoherent preferences are irrational. I might be 
rational in arranging to change, but not in what I had become. Nor could I rationally act on such 
preferences, for one cannot maximize on incoherent ones. But this is not the situation in DDs and 
TPs.) 
     But I used to view all nausea alike, while now I see it as being of two types, that preceded by 
certain intentions and rewards, and that not. Do my preferences still covary coherently with 
properties of the conditions preferred? Yes. The different properties to which I now have 
different attitudes were always possible properties of possible conditions, only I used to be 
indifferent to the differences; now, I discriminate. But I am still coherent, still treat like cases 
alike. Offer me the TP deal again and I'll prefer to drink more toxin. 
     But before, I dispreferred all conditions of nausea; now I prefer some of them: aren't I being 
incoherent in my preferences? No. For my preferences to be coherent at a time, they need not be 
identical over time. I coherently dispreferred all nausea conditions before, and coherently prefer 
some nausea condition-types and not other different nausea condition-types now. 
     But isn't there something inherently unpreferable about being nauseated, this making my 
preferences incoherent with the properties of the thing preferred? Different question. Whether my 
preferences cohere with themselves--treat like cases alike--is separate from whether they track 
objective preferability, cohere with value facts in the world. And we already found reason to 
doubt both the existence of such things, and whether they would cause problems for our view. 
 
8. Kavka's Objections 
 
Kavka too entertained the rationality of direct preference-change in the DD, but rejected it.
33
 His 
thinking: it would maximize on one's preferences for them to change, but since by their standards 
the action one is to come to prefer and intend is not preferable, they make direct revision 
rationally inappropriate and contingently impossible. Nor then, can one directly rationally intend 
to retaliate. But one can rationally arrange for retaliation to occur, even if one cannot rationally 
directly intend to retaliate. So it may be rational to delegate the decision to retaliate to one whose 
preferences embrace it, to a machine which would do it automatically, or even to a modified 
33. Kavka, `Some Paradoxes.' 
future version of oneself.
34
 But however rational it may be to arrange self-modification, one is 
not rational in the process of being altered (for the above reason). And it is to arrange to be 
"corrupted". This can take three forms. (A) One arranges to acquire a propensity to act against 
one's preferences not to retaliate. Since a rational agent's actions follow his preferences, but a 
corrupted agent's do not, this is arranging to be irrational. (B) One arranges to add to one's initial 
preferences both a preference to retaliate, and a propensity to act on it. But this too is arranging to 
be irrational, for one's preferences in the main still dictate non-retaliation. But one arranges to 
have and act on a discordant preference to retaliate. (C) One arranges to acquire a revised set of 
preferences or beliefs, given which retaliation maximizes. So thorough is the revision that one 
would prefer all things considered to retaliate, making it rational relative to one's new attitudes; 
but not to one's old, so this too is a corruption. 
     So Kavka's views differ from mine in two ways. First, he thinks that, even for an ideally 
rational agent, that it would maximize for his preferences to change would not directly induce 
change; that would not be a justified automatic response to events. Rather, he must treat himself 
as an object or mechanism which he must arrange to get "rewired" with psychological, social, or 
physical "surgery". He might be rational in arranging to acquire different preferences, but would 
be non-rational or irrational in acquiring them. But I see no obstacle to them changing as a 
rational, direct response to events. 
     Second, Kavka sees the revisions as "corruptions"; one makes oneself irrational, even if, as in 
(C), one would not so judge oneself by one's new attitudes. He is clearly right on this in (A) and 
(B), for choosing against the balance of one's preferences is a corruption of one's practical reason; 
also about (C) if one revises one's beliefs on pragmatic pretexts, for this corrupts one's epistemic 
rationality. But there seems no justification for the charge in versions of (C) where one's beliefs 
stay epistemically rational, but where one's preferences are pragmatically revised. For one comes 
to prefer as one should in the circumstances, as measured by one's original standards. One then 
chooses as on ought given one's new preferences. To impugn the resultant attitudes and actions 
we need a standard of rationality by which one's later comportment fails. The only one offered is 
the standard of one's previous preferences; but as we have argued here, they are, in effect, self-
invalidating as standards in PCSs. To be rational by their standards, one must supplant them with 
new ones. 
 
9. Rational Self-Alteration and Moral Scruple 
 
There may be other objections to the attitudes and actions we recommend. E.g., maybe they are 
immoral.
35
 But an agent in the initial position of the DD undergoing these revisions might yet be 
rational. And if she began with moral values, had rationally to revise them, and if to be moral is 
to choose rationally from initially moral values, arguably she remains moral. She begins with 
correct values, intends to do what a moral agent would do in the circumstances, does what one 
34. Ibid., 520-52. See also Kavka, `The Toxin Puzzle' and `Responses to the Paradox of 
Deterrence.' 
35. Kavka, `Some Paradoxes,' 523-525. 
would do, and has the character, the values, one would have in the circumstances, properly 
broadly conceived. 
     But Kavka focuses on a conception of morality which, if the agent accepts it, may make the 
intentions, choices, and values we advocate immoral and irrational. Suppose an agent in a DD 
began with the preferences (1) that harms be minimal, (2) never to prefer an action discordant 
with (1), (3) always to act as someone with (1) would, and (4) never to reduce the degree to 
which her character, intentions, and actions fit (1)-(3): then Intending and Acting would violate 
some of these preferences. And Kavka seems to think one must have them to be moral and 
rational. To have (1) is to take the right value attitude to harms; to have (2) is to embrace the 
Wrongful Intentions Principle (WIP: an intention is wrong if to perform a wrong action); (3), the 
Right-Good Principle (RGP: an action is right if a good person would do it); and (4), the Virtue-
Preservation-Principle (VPP: never reduce your moral virtue).
36
 
     But such agents would not be in a DD, for it would not maximize for them to Intend; 
Intending and Acting would be non-maximizing (due to preferences (2) and (4), which require 
refraining from both), and so irrational by their own standards.
37
 Moreover the first preference, 
that harms be minimal, since it requires having different preferences (for the harm-deterring 
effect), conflicts with the second, which forbids different preferences. And the third, to do what 
someone averse to harms would do, conflicts with the fourth, to keep one's virtue defined as 
having (1). For to minimize harms, one must prefer to retaliate so as to deter, but would find so 
preferring a corruption forbidden by (4). Thus a rational and moral agent cannot have those 
preferences, for they are incompatible in the DD; they are ill-ordered, their holder, irrational. 
     Kavka concluded from the DD that our schema for evaluating the morality of persons, 
intentions and actions was conflicted. I think it shows one of two other things. First, a rational 
morality must prioritize conformity to the above principles, and so a rational and moral agent 
must have the corresponding preferences coherently so ordered that she can maximize on them in 
PCSs. Note the parallels with our proposal on value realism. Even if the targets of those 
preferences are objectively valuable, in a morally plausible valuation they must have different 
values. Thus someone whose preferences tracked objective preferability would have a coherent 
preference ranking, maximization on it sometimes requiring sacrifice of some conditions for 
others. E.g., one's objectively correct preferences must not preclude acquiring a retaliatory 
preference in maximizing on a preference ranking in which minimizing harms was originally 
most preferred. 
     The other possibility: (2), (3) and (4) should not be read as preferences, but as principles, 
ways of choosing given preferences. And they should be construed as consequences of the view 
that a moral agent chooses instrumentally rationally from (initially) moral preferences. Thus she 
is now choosing morally correctly and is morally good just if she (1) began averse to harms, (2) 
would never intend wrongly, never intend to do something not dictated by the intentions she 
would have reasoning instrumentally from that aversion, (3) would always do what an agent 
complying with (1) and (2) would do, and (4) would never fail to have the dispositions dictated 
36. Kavka, `Some Paradoxes.' 
37. Lewis makes a similar point in his `Devil's Bargains,' 142. 
by practical reasoning compliant with (1)-(3). There is no conflict between the initially correct 
attitude to harms and WIP, RGP, and VPP, since these just require what practical reasoning from 
an initial aversion to harms requires, and since that aversion is only initially correct; it becomes 
incorrect if compliance with those principles through rational choices requires abandoning it.
38
 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
An action is rational only if it expresses rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes 
given one's initial preferences. Where preferences can affect outcomes, instrumental rationality 
requires one to adopt (or retain) whichever preferences would maximize. One may have to adopt 
new ones, ones whose possession advances the originals; one must then maximize on the new. 
All of this is justified by the normative principle standardly thought constitutive of instrumental 
rationality: "maximize." And nothing in the nature of preferences or the conditions on their 
rational revision opposes instrumentally justified changes in basic preferences. A rational 
psychology is plastic. How plastic depends on how efficacious various alterations to it are seen to 
be in maximizing on its current preferences.
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38. For more on this, see my `Kavka Revisited.' 
39. For more on this, see my `Preference's Progress.' 
